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Executive summary 
The Working Group on Fishery Systems met at ICES headquarters in Copenhagen 
from 11-14 October. This year Dorothy Dankel (Norway) took over for Kjellrun Hiis 
Hauge (Norway) as Chair. We were an intimate group with seven (effectively six) 
participants. The meeting was focused on two main tasks: 1) presentations from par-
ticipants directly related to our ToRs, and 2) drafting and writing a manuscript on the 
history and future of WGFS for submission to ICES Journal of Marine Science, spe-
cifically related to ToR a) and ToR b). The rest of this section is a shortened and un-
referenced version of the manuscript. 
This year, the Working Group on Fishery Systems celebrates 10 years since it was 
established by ICES, inter alia “to develop a framework and methodology for the 
analysis of fishery system performance” and “propose ... interdisciplinary research 
which will advance ICES future capability in fishery systems analysis”  . The WGFS 
created a forum to bring social scientists into ICES to help describe the socio-
ecological system around fisheries, and to use this perspective to intensify ICES effec-
tiveness.  
The key to governance in the science-policy interface is to put uncertainty at the cen-
ter of the table. Others have argued, for good reason, that overemphasizing uncer-
tainty in fisheries advice can lead to policy paralysis. However, broader experience in 
science and policy indicates that underemphasizing uncertainty is even more dan-
gerous. One effective approach for dealing with science in situations of high stakes 
and high uncertainty is through “post-normal science” developed by Funtowicz and 
Ravetz (1990). An important pillar of post-normal science is the inclusion of an ex-
tended peer community, which comprises different types of experts within a broad 
policy community. These communities acknowledge, analyse and communicate un-
certainties through extended peer review. Hence these communities are the founda-
tion for credible, legitimate and salient science for policy advice. In fact in many 
cases, a single scientific “answer” will never be available for complex systems such as 
fisheries. In these cases, more research does not lead to less uncertainty but can in-
stead lead to unforeseen complexities. Concurrently, the potential impacts of deci-
sions based on uncertain science have very large consequences (biological and/or 
social) and therefore values are in dispute. 
We highlight two examples from outside fisheries science to illustrate the importance 
of putting uncertainty forward early and in a transparent manner. The first is the 
recent “Climategate” controversy from late 2009, which originated at the Climatic 
Research Unit at the University of East Anglia (UK) after an e-mail server hack and 
instigated an independent review panel of the Climatic Research Unit. Overselling 
certainty creates vulnerability in the scientific basis for policy. Such vulnerabilities 
can and will be exploited easily to obstruct and delay policy intervention.  
An example of a severe scientific credibility crisis between an environmental gov-
ernment agency and the authority providing the scientific advice for policy support is 
the controversy originated by a whistle-blower at the Netherlands National Institute 
for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) in early 1999. The media was the last 
way out for RIVM Senior statistician Hans De Kwaadsteniet who decried his institu-
tion for using poorly validated computer models as the basis of the advice given to 
the Dutch government. De Kwaadsteiniet further claimed that RIVM presented its 
advice as point values with spurious precision and opaque uncertainties. The new 
focus is on coping with uncertainties.  
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These dangers from overselling certainty are relevant for ICES because we are also 
communicating uncertain results. The majority of ICES assessment scientists have 
experienced being asked to produce certainty that is not really there. 
The WGFS has documented a number of examples of a post-normal approach to fish-
eries management. An important step in post-normal science is the identification of 
extended peer communities. For example, in the EFIMAS, SAFMAMS and JAKFISH 
projects, scientists have built extended peer communities particularly through re-
gional advisory councils (RACs), comprising industry, non-governmental organiza-
tions, managers, administrators and other scientists. The first step in including these 
extended peer communities is to jointly define the research question. This process has 
been initiated by both scientists and the industry. Pedigrees and uncertainty matrices 
have been used to facilitate the communication of model complexities, critical as-
sumptions and uncertainties. Questionnaires and focus groups have been used to 
give feedback with regard to the collective learning and the entire participatory proc-
ess.  
A major benefit of the close collaboration within the extended peer community has 
been that industry priorities are explicitly included in the investigations. The partici-
pants recognize the potential of the modelling approach for demonstrating and rising 
awareness of the complexity of fisheries management. The participants found the 
collaborative modelling useful in finding a common frame and definition for complex 
issues.  
A number of scientists are doing participatory modelling now, and they are feeding 
their knowledge and experiences in the ICES expert groups. Apart from WGFS, the 
Study Group on Risk Assessment and Management Advice (SGRAMA) and the 
Study Group on Management Strategies (SGMAS) were two ICES study groups that 
specifically dealt with the challenges of high uncertainties and risks in fisheries ad-
vice and management. These study groups have expired, so WGFS is now the logical 
the place to continue this line of thought in future.  
ICES is now faced with providing scientific advice within a broader marine and mari-
time governance context. Legitimacy, credibility and saliency are issues of utmost 
importance when the peer community is extended in a post-normal science-policy 
context. WGFS has been active in outlining these issues, but now the concern is to put 
the theory into practice. We therefore suggest a new role for WGFS. First, Working 
Group Maritime Systems (WGMS) would be an appropriate name change to flag 
broader objectives of maritime planning. We also think this new title will highlight 
the need of an extended peer competency and involvement beyond fisheries in our 
working group. We then propose that WGMS reviews the governance demands in 
the different ICES expert groups. 
On the 10th anniversary of WGFS, we propose a turn towards maritime systems to 
aid ICES in providing maritime advice, including effective communication of uncer-
tainty within an extended peer community. This is the key to effective advice under 
uncertainty in the maritime system. 
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1 Opening of the meeting 
The meeting opened at 12:30 on 11 October 2010 by Chair Dorothy Dankel. Introduc-
tions were first made after which the Chair presented the Agenda and her vision for 
the meeting. 
2 Adoption of the agenda 
The agenda outlined in Annex Two was proposed and adopted. 
3 Report of the 2010 Meeting 
3.1 Attendance 
The reason for the drop in attendance this year was due to the end of funding for 
interdisciplinary EU projects (like JAKFISH) that have in the past held workshops in 
conjunction with WGFS. About five other participants gave notice that despite their 
eagerness in attending the meeting, their schedules would not allow for it. The Chair, 
however, noted the benefit of an intimate group towards the production of a manu-
script for peer review in ICES Journal of Marine Science. The purpose of this paper 
was to summarize WGFS experiences on its 10 year anniversary, review reasons un-
certainty should be placed at the center of the table, and to outline recommendations 
for the future of the group. 
3.2 Terms of Reference 
The ToRs for the 2010 WGFS meeting were as follows: 
ToR a): Review and generate recommendations about the future structure of 
risk evaluation and management strategy research within ICES toward greater 
inclusiveness across the fisheries system and greater usefulness in policy ad-
vice. This includes re-evaluating the role of WGFS in light of several other 
ICES groups involved in risk evaluation and management strategy.  
ToR b): Evaluate the past contribution of WGFS activities on ICES as a way to 
in-form future directions. 
ToR c): Review ongoing work in social network analysis on the science - policy 
boundary. 
To meet these ToRs, the Chair proposed that the working group write a short com-
munication to the ICES Journal of Marine Science for peer-review publication. The 
Chair proposed this idea, on the 10th anniversary of the group, as a way to effectively 
address and communicate ToRs a) and b). Considering that WGFS has traditionally 
been comprised of many interdisciplinary scientists (funded by EU projects to attend 
WGFS) outside traditional ICES boundaries, the work of WGFS has not always been 
visible to the broad range of ICES scientists. The Chair felt that a publication review-
ing the recent work of WGFS and affiliated projects in ICES JMS would be the most 
effective way to make WGFS visible and to suggest a new route for the group. All 
participants agreed to this plan. 
Therefore, the Chair asked the participants to keep the short communication paper in 
the back of their minds while presentations on the three ToRs were presented the first 
two days. On the eve of the second meeting day, a paper structure and theme was 
agreed to for the paper and writing tasks were distributed. It was also agreed that the 
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three former chairs not present at this year’s meeting would be invited to review the 
manuscript. 
The following subsections outline the WGFS presentations and discussion on the 
three ToRs. 
3.3 Summary of ToR a) 
WGFS has identified a handful of working groups within ICES that are dealing with 
risk evaluation and management: SGRAMA, SGMAS, WGICZM, and WKIMM.  
3.3.1 WGICZM (future name: WGMPCAM) 
Christine Röckmann gave an overview of the work of the WGICZM (future name: 
WGMPCAM), summarizing the 2010 report and pointing to the intended future focus 
of WGMPCZM. WGFS sees potential for collaboration, synergies and cross-
pollination with WGICZM (future name: WGMPCAM). In WGICZM’s 2010 report, 
the role of uncertainty and risk based decision-making is mentioned explicitly under 
ToR d): Progress the development of an integrated decision-making framework for ICZM. 
The 2010 report mentions examples from Canada and Germany where risk assess-
ment structures exist or are in development, taking account of ecological, socio-
economic, socio-cultural and governance issues. “In Canada, the development of risk-
based approaches to support decision-making continues to be a priority for integrated coastal 
zone management. The development of a conceptual framework for risk-based integrated man-
agement is considered as a means to more effectively use existing information and ensure the 
efficient deployment of resources as well as renewing the focus priority on setting. Strength-
ening the initial phases of this process is key to building a credible and pragmatic management 
process that has the potential to be successful at achieving realistic goals within a well defined 
scope and scale of issues.” The issue of risk-based management was also discussed at 
the ICES ASC 2010 in Nantes within Session B. Marine spatial planning (MSP) is a 
field where stakes as well as uncertainties in the sectors involved are high. Today, the 
ICES community is faced with a new Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) in the Euro-
pean Union (EC, 2007). MSP is seen as a tool for improved decision-making that pro-
vides a framework including the extended peer community for arbitrating between 
competing human activities and managing their impacts on the marine environment. 
3.3.2 Workshop on Introducing Coupled Ecological-Economic Modelling and 
Risk Assessment into Management Tools (WKIMM):  
Economists and ecologists reviewed regional examples of state-of-the-art in ecologi-
cal-economic modelling in fisheries science and identified ways for further develop-
ment and integration in relation to scientific fish stock and fisheries advice. WGFS 
sees the importance of cross-pollination with WKIMM as a concrete way to improve 
the extended peer community within ICES working groups. One of the co-conveners 
of WKIMM is an active past member of WGFS, so cross-pollination should be readily 
feasible. 
3.3.3 Request from SGRAMA 
In addition to ToR a), SGRAMA (now expired) asked WGFS to shed light on the fol-
lowing two topics: 
i ) Experience gained outside ICES points to stakeholder and manager par-
ticipation as being essential in a risk assessment process. The “how to” 
part of such participation should be based on recommendations from 
Working Group on Fishery Systems (WGFS). 
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ii ) The planning of, and conducting of a proper evaluation of the case study 
is needed. In particular, criteria for the success (or failure) of the risk as-
sessment need to be defined upfront. 
During the 2010 WGFS meeting, Jeroen van der Sluijs from Utrecht University in the 
Netherlands engaged WGFS in a day-long discussion on various facets of uncertainty 
in the science-policy interface, mainly drawing on examples within climate science 
and environmental science. The Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and 
the Environment (RIVM) has, with the help of outside consultants (extended peer 
review), actively wrote reviews and handbooks of best practices for scientists that are 
applicable to fisheries scientists (see references below).  
The International Risk Governance Council in Geneva www.igrc.org is also an im-
portant source of general information on risk governance. They have produced a 
general policy brief, with an annex using fisheries management as a case study (IRGC 
2009). They have also published a much more comprehensive White Paper on Risk 
Governance (2005) authored by Ortwen Renn. Renn is perhaps the best known au-
thor in Europe on risk governance and is the Scientific and Managing Director of 
DIALOGIK http://www.dialogik-expert.de/en/ an organization that has done a con-
siderable amount of work in fisheries among other subjects. He is also the author of a 
very substantial handbook on participatory risk governance (Renn, 2008).  
References 
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in risk governance. International Risk Governance Council, Geneva, 2009 ISBN 978-2-
9700631-9-3 
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spectives in integrated assessment of climate change. Climatic Change, 75: 359-389. 
Renn, Ortwin. 2008. Risk Governance. Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World.
Renn, Ortwin. 2005. White Paper on Risk Governance: Towards An Integrative Approach. 
International Risk Governance Council, Geneva, 
 London; 
Earthscan 
http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/IRGC_WP_No_1_Risk Governance reprinted version.pdf 
van der Sluijs, J. P. 2002. A way out of the credibility crisis of models used in integrated envi-
ronmental assessment. Futures, 34: 133-146. 
van der Sluijs, J. P. 2007. Uncertainty and precaution in environmental management: Insights 
from the UPEM conference. Environmental Modelling & Software, 22: 590-598. 
van der Sluijs, J. P., Petersen, A. C., Janssen, P. H. M., Risbey, J. S. and Ravetz, J. R. 2008. Ex-
ploring the quality of evidence for complex and contested policy decisions. Environmental 
Resource Letters, 3: 9. 
van der Sluijs, J. P., Risbey, J. S., Kloprogge, P., Ravetz, J. R., Funtowicz, S. O., Corral Quintana, 
S., Guimarães Pereira, Â., et al. 2003. RIVM/MNP Guidance for Uncertainty Assessment 
and Communication: Detailed Guidance (RIVM/MNP Guidance for Uncertainty Assess-
ment and Communication Series, Volume 3), Utrecht University, Utrecht, 2003. 
3.3.4 Taking environmental variability into account in fisheries management  
Christine Röckmann presented Brunel et al.’s study on ‘Performance of harvest con-
trol rules in a variable environment’ (Brunel et al., 2009). One main conclusion of this 
study is that if changing environmental conditions are negatively influencing the 
state of a given fish stock, then taking environmental variability into account could 
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benefit the management of this stock. In the instances modelled in this paper, envi-
ronmental harvest control rules performed better then than the conventional ones. 
The benefits are strongest when the correlation between the environmental variable 
and the stock dynamics is larger. WGFS considers this approach of incorporating 
environmental variability into management rules an important field for future re-
search. WGFS sees HCRs as an important boundary object, which benefits from the 
involvement of an extended peer community. 
Reference 
Brunel, T., Piet, G. J., Van Hal, R. and Röckmann, C. 2010. Performance of harvest control rules 
in a variable environment. ICES Journal of Marine Science: Journal du Conseil, 67: 1051-
1062. 
3.4 Summary of ToR b) 
3.4.1 Concise summary of recent WGFS achievements 
In 2010 the Working Group on Fishery Systems is celebrating 10 years since it was 
established by ICES, inter alia “to develop a framework and methodology for the 
analysis of fishery system performance” and “propose ... interdisciplinary research 
which will advance ICES future capability in fishery systems analysis” (ICES, 2000). 
The WGFS created a forum to bring social scientists into ICES to help describe the 
socio-ecological system around fisheries, and to use this perspective to intensify ICES 
effectiveness.  
During the first five years the focus was on case studies of cod management. This 
culminated in a series of WGFS papers presented at the 2006 ICES Symposium on 
Fisheries Management involving four major contributions: 
The idea of describing the science policy interface in the CFP as yearly “TAC Ma-
chine”. This image contributed greatly to subsequent analyses of how to improve the 
link between fisheries science, stakeholders and policy (Schwach et al., 2007; Degnbol 
and McCay, 2007; Holm and Nielsen, 2004); 
Documentation of surprising depth of dissatisfaction within ICES of the way the fish-
eries science policy interface was operating, particularly in respect to the handling 
and communication of uncertainty (Hauge et al., 2007; Wilson and Delaney, 2005; 
Schwach et al., 2007);  
A series of retrospective analyses of assessments revealing systemic biases (Reeves 
and Pastoors, 2007; Schwach et al., 2007); 
Documentation of stakeholder perspectives on science, revealing the challenges to 
scientific legitimacy that are particularly important under the CFP, especially in rela-
tion to other places such as Norway (Delaney et al., 2007).  
WGFS then turned to the question of what could be done about the problems diag-
nosed in the cod case studies. The strategy was to begin working directly with scien-
tists and stakeholders to gather insights on what kinds of changes in the fishery 
system would result in more effective input of various kinds of knowledge into pol-
icy. There were three import foci of this research. The first was the mobilization of 
fishers’ knowledge into improving fisheries science and advice, particularly through 
looking at the best practices in collaborative research between fishers and scientists. 
The second was an analysis of ICES interactions with both stakeholders and policy-
makers. The third focus involved reaching out to other areas where scientific advice 
plays a critical policy role to explore what has been learned there about effective ad-
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vice giving. The results included a) the observation of a considerable number of prac-
tical experiences of stakeholder/scientists interactions that resulted in reports high-
lighting best practices (Hegland and Wilson, 2009, Johnson and van Densen, 2007, 
Wilson and Pascoe, 2006); b) an in-depth analysis of the science policy interface in 
ICES including recommendations for improving it (ICES, 2007b) (Wilson, 2009); and 
c) a series of presentations and a workshop in which five experts from outside fisher-
ies (one each from power generation, natural disaster management, risk assessment, 
climate change, and the communication of risk in the mass media) joined 23 fisheries 
experts from various disciplines. The workshop resulted in rich interactions and the 
central message was clear: many interests should be represented when science and 
policy meet and uncertainty should be placed at the center of the discussion (ICES, 
2008). 
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Holm, P., et al. 2007. Policy and Knowledge In Fisheries Management: A Policy Brief. ICES 
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Fisheries Management in Europe, University Of Amsterdam Press, Amsterdam. 
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Wilson, D. C., and Pascoe, S. 2006. Delivering Complex Scientific Advice to Multiple Stake-
holders. In The Knowledge Base for Fisheries Management. Developments in Aquaculture 
And Fisheries Science Series, Pp. 329-353. Ed. by L. Motos and D. C. Wilson. Elsevier. 
3.4.2 Review of WGFS past achievements from a former and inaugural chair, 
Poul Degnbol 
The main contributions of WGFS to ICES are very pervasive but not linked to WGFS 
by direct references. WGFS has had an important impact on the culture in ICES and 
on the ability for reflection on the role of science – and thus also for the quality of 
discussions. The contributions and discussions at the recent theme session P at the 
ICES ASC in Nantes could in my opinion not have been possible if we had not had 
this infusion of reflection coming from the social sciences into the ICES environment. 
Governance and communication issues are now attracting a lot of interest in the ICES 
community – also among the hard core natural scientists – and we have now several 
fora where ICES natural scientists can discuss this with people with a professional 
background for this. For the social scientists we think WGFS has been a grand oppor-
tunity to dig into the science-policy linkage interface using fisheries as a case. 
One important example of this, firmly based in WGFS, was the Policy Knowledge in 
Fisheries Management (PKFM) project which was the first project in the EU frame-
work programmes where considerable effort was dedicated to reflection of the role of 
science in European fisheries policy, in a collaborative effort between natural scien-
tists, sociologists and economists – and even a historian. 
The impact on the current procedures is probably most clearly reflected in the break-
through for transparency in the production of advice. Ten years ago this was run as a 
black box model and there was strong faith in the ICES system that this was how it 
should be. I heard at the time often the simplistic diagnosis from colleagues that the 
only problem in fisheries management was that scientific advice was not followed. In 
2003 ICES opened ACFM for observation for the first time on an experimental basis, 
with great fear and concern from many. It was people active in WGFS which sup-
ported and promoted this. Since then transparency is now the norm and is seen as a 
great step forward by everybody – proof by demonstration.  
Where WGFS ought to have had a larger impact is in relation to management plans – 
in retrospect it would have been a big improvement if WGFS had been linked closer 
to the Study Group on Management Strategies (SGMAS). SGMAS was populated 
largely by hard-core modellers, but was also one of the first quantitative groups to be 
open to stakeholders and did include a stakeholder in meetings. 
3.5 Summary of ToR c) 
Doug Wilson gave a presentation on some preliminary results of the social network 
analysis done within the JAKFISH project. His case study was on the Northern Prawn 
Fishery in Australia.  
3.5.1 Summary of social network analysis and some theory behind the method 
Social network analysis (SNA) is a sociological technique based on the analysis of 
data on relationships between people, such as the frequency and quality of their in-
terpersonal context. It has been widely applied in the areas of formal organizations, 
social movements and in general policy-making contexts (Knoke, 1993). The use of 
social network analysis to examine fisheries management has been around for some-
time (Maiolo and Johnson, 1989; Gibbs 2008; Grafton 2005)) but using it specifically to 
examine science-boundary networks is just beginning to be applied in marine man-
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agement (Bodin, 2006; Bodin et al., 2006; Crona, 2006; Hartley, 2010; Hartley and 
Glass, 2010; Wilson, 2009). 
The theory behind the network approach to society, laid out in detail in the appended 
paper, is rooted in one of the central debates in sociology. This is the question of 
whether society is best conceptualized as the product of the interaction of atomized 
individuals (agency) or as supra-individual social facts that are irreducible to indi-
vidual actions (structure). Agency approaches use an epistemology based on meth-
odological individualism. They currently enjoy greater prominence in the social 
science as a whole, where the rational choice approach to agency is dominant. Their 
strength is the ability to develop quantative models of social processes, their weak-
ness is that they reduce individuals to instances of a simple theory of behaviour, e.g. 
utility maximization, and the empirical relevance of these theories of behaviour are 
limited to particular institutional contexts. Structural approaches are less adequate 
than agency approaches in both the clarity of their basic concepts and the elegance of 
their models. Agency approaches, however, because of their reliance on the simple 
theories of behaviour, have never succeeded in defining and modelling many conse-
quential social phenomena such as culture, norms, organization and especially 
power.  
Sociologists have made some progress in finding ways to bridge this gap, relying 
most recently on the idea of networks. Social network theory (e.g. Burt, 1982; 
Granovetter, 1992) conceptualizes individuals as embedded within systems of con-
crete, patterned interactions with other individuals. These patterned interactions 
provide a concept of social structure that is well defined and allows theories involv-
ing supra-individual variables to be measured and tested. In addition to its ability to 
make use of formal models, network theory is also able to incorporate important 
qualitative dynamics such as discourses and identities (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 
1994).  
The network approach is very useful for studying the science-policy interface. It was 
a central concept in Wilson’s (2009) study of ICES and its clients. This and other stud-
ies have suggested the importance of “polycentric” institutions for science policy 
deliberations. Ostrom (2001) defines polycentric systems as “an organization of 
small-, medium-, and large-scale democratic units that exercise considerable inde-
pendence” For Ostrom the strength of a polycentric governance mechanizm is its 
ability to experiment with diverse approaches and provide for a range of responses to 
external shocks. In theory, at least, there is a clear analogy to science-based policy-
making in conditions of uncertainty. Indeed, for Cash and Clark (2001) the polycen-
tric networks that they see characterizing effective use of science in policy do this 
because of quite similar reasons. They are able provide methodological coherence 
across scale levels while still allowing local specialization, the redundancy of the sys-
tem provides for multiple pathways to encourage innovation and flexibility. A poly-
centric network also facilitates stakeholder capacity building and involvement (Cash 
and Clark 2001). It is an institutional design that gives form to the continuously oper-
ating process of debate and dialogue Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) see as the next 
higher level in their description of the scientific practice needed for addressing uncer-
tainty. Furthermore, formal social network analysis can test if this form of interaction 
really leads to less divergent views and more cooperative attitudes.  
The formal network analysis literature has examined many concepts important to the 
science-policy interface. Trust has been found to result from the frequency of interac-
tions - the more interactions with positive outcomes between two people the greater 
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the trust and from third parties (Granovetter, 1985). If third parties are shared, trust 
increases; if third parties are not shared, trust decreases (Burt and Knez, 1995). Other 
studies have found that the same effect attaches to the multiplexity of relationships, 
i.e. the degree to which a relationship has several facets (Coleman 1988, Hart, 1988).  
More direct analyses of fisheries have found, for example, that in diffuse manage-
ment networks, such as Atlantic herring, it is important for scientists and managers to 
cultivate relationships with people who bridge these groups (Hartley and Glass, 
2010). The context of interaction is important as well. The formality of the communi-
cations influences the degree to which perceptions are shared (Habermas, 1987). If 
the only interaction participants have is at formal meetings, this may have a negative 
influence on trust. The design of the policy process has a direct bearing on the quality 
of interactions (Jentoft and McCay 1995). These factors may turn out to be more im-
portant than either the characteristics of the individual such as their scientific creden-
tials. Finally, being a diffuse, polycentric network has benefitted ICES by making it 
easier for scientists to resist pressure to take the focus away from problematic uncer-
tainties and other attempts to present science in inappropriate ways (Wilson 2009).  
References 
Bodin, O. 2006. “What You Know is Who You Know? Communication Patterns Among Re-
source Users as a Prerequisite for Co-management” Ecology and Society 7 (2). [online] URL: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art7/ 
Bodin, O., Crona, B., and Ernstson, H. 2006. Social networks in natural resource management: 
what is there to learn from a structural perspective? Ecology and Society, 11: 1–8. 
Burt, R. 1983. “Studying Status/Role Sets Using Mass Surveys” in Burt, R and Minor M.J. Ap-
plied Network Analysis Beverley Hills: Sage Publications. 
Burt, R. and M. Knez 1995. "Kinds of Third-Part Effects on Trust" Rationality and Society 7(3): 
255-292  
Cash, D., and Clark, W. 2001. From Science to Policy: Assessing the Assessment Process. John. 
F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Faculty, Research Working Paper 
Series RWP01-045. 
Coleman, J.S. 1988 "Social Capital in Creation of Human Capital" American Journal of Sociol-
ogy 94:S95-S120 Garcia, Serge M.2005 Fishery Science and Decision Making: Dire Straights 
to Sustainability Bulletin of Marine Science 76(2):171-196. 
Crona, B. 2006 “Supporting and Enhancing Development of Heterogeneous Ecological Knowl-
edge among Resource Users in a Kenyan Seascape” 11(1): [online] 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/ articles/1712.html 
Emirbayer, M. and J. Goodwin 1994. "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency" 
American Journal of Sociology 99:1411-54 
Gibbs, M. T. 2008. Network governance in fisheries. Marine Policy, 32:113–119. 
Grafton, Q. R. "Social capital and fisheries governance." Ocean & coastal management 48.9-10 
(2005): 753-766. 
Granovetter, M. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness" 
American Journal of Sociology 91: 481-510. 
Granovetter, M. 1992. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." 
In M. Granovetter and R. Swedberg (eds.): The Sociology of Economic Life.
Habermas, J. 1987 The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume II Lifeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reasoning Boston: Beacon Press. 
 Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
ICES WGFS REPORT 2010 | 11 
 
Hart, K. 1988. "Kinship, Contract, and Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants in an 
African City Slum" pp 176-193 in Gambetta, D. (Ed) Trust: Making and Breaking Coopera-
tive Relations Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Hartley T.W. 2010. “Fishery management as a governance network: Examples from the Gulf of 
Maine and the potential for communication network analysis research in fisheries” Marine 
Policy doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2010.03.005 
Hartley, T. W. and C. Glass. Science-to-management pathways in US Atlantic herring man-
agement: using governance network structure and function to track information flow and 
potential influence. ICES Journal of Marine Science, 67: 000–000. 
Jentoft, S. and B.J. McCay 1995. "User participation in fisheries management: Lessons drawn 
from international experiences" Marine Policy 19(3): 227-246. 
Knoke, D. 1993. "Networks as Political Glue: Explaining Public Policy-Making" Chapter 9, Pp 
164-184 in Wilson, W.J. (Ed) Sociology and the Public Agenda Newbury Park: Sage, 
American Sociological Association Presidential Series. 
Maiolo, J. R., and Johnson, J. C. 1989. Discovering communication networks in marine fisheries: 
implications for management. In Marine Resource Utilization. Proceedings of a Confer-
ence on Social Science Issues. Ed. by J. S. Thomas, L. Maril, and E. P. Durrenberger. Missis-
sippi–Alabama Sea Grant Consortium, Mobile, AL. 
Ostrom, E. 2001. Vulnerability and Polycentric Governance Systems. IHDP Update Nr. 3/2001 
12 | ICES WGFS REPORT 2010 
 
Annex 1: List of participants for Working Group on Fishery Systems, 
(WGFS) 11-14 October 2010 
 
NAME ADDRESS TELEPHONE/FAX E-MAIL 
Robert Aps Estonian Marine 
Institute 
14 Mäealuse Street 
EE-126 18 Tallinn 
Estonia 
 robert.aps@ness.sea.ee 
Dorothy 
Dankel 
Chair 
Institute of Marine 
Research 
P.O. Box 1870 
N-5817 Bergen 
Norway 
+47 55 23 85 56 
+47 55 23 86 87 
dorothy.dankel@imr.no 
Poul Degnbol ICES 
H.C. Andersens Blv 44-
46 
DK-1553 Copenhagen 
V 
Denmark 
+45 33386763 poul.degnbol@ices.dk 
Gurpreet 
Padda 
Department for 
Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs 
Nobel House, Area 2D 
17 Smith Square 
SW1P 3JR London 
UK 
+44 20 72 38 45 
89 
gurpreet.padda@defra.gsi.gov.uk 
Christine 
Röckmann 
Wageningen IMARES 
P.O. Box 68 
NL-1970 AB Ĳmuiden 
the Netherlands 
+31 317 487 194 
 
Christine.Rockmann@wur.nl 
Jeroen van der 
Sluijs 
Utrecht University 
P.O Box 80125 
NL-3508 TC Utrecht 
Netherlands 
 j.p.vandersluijs@uu.nl 
Douglas Clyde 
Kongshøj 
Wilson 
Innovative Fisheries 
Management 
Aalborg University,  
Department of 
Development and 
Planning 
Fibigerstræde 13 
DK-9220 Aalborg Ø 
Denmark 
+45 9940 3674 dw@ifm.dk 
 
ICES WGFS REPORT 2010 | 13 
 
Annex 2: Agenda 
 
 
MONDAY, 11 
OCTOBER 2010 
TUESDAY, 12 
OCTOBER 2010 
WEDNESDAY, 13 
OCTOBER 2010 
THURSDAY, 14 
OCTOBER 2010  
 
09.15-12.00 
 
Arrival 
Eat lunch before 
meeting!  
Jeroen on the 
“outsider’s 
view” and 
models of 
governance (see 
attached 
references) 
Discussion of 
science-policy 
boundary and 
governance in 
fisheries 
Distribution of 
report writing 
activities 
(paper/report) 
Writing 
Update on 
writing and 
discussion when 
needed 
 
12.00-13.30 
Meeting Opening 
by Dorothy 
Dorothy on ToR b) 
(outline of possible 
ICES JMS policy 
brief article) 
Discussion on 
possible policy 
brief* collaboration 
in 
connection/addition 
to the report 
(No Doug in 
afternoon) 
LUNCH 
 
LUNCH 
 
LUNCH 
 
13.30-15.00  
Robert on ToR a) 
Gurpreet on science 
communication 
 
Jeroen 
continued 
Christine on 
ToR a) 
(WGICZM) 
Writing 
Final wrap-up, 
walk-thru of 
report 
Discussion on 
future work, 
next year’s 
WGFS 
 
15.00-17.00 
 
Doug on ToR c) 
 
Christine on 
Brunel et al. 
Performance of 
HCRs in a 
variable 
environment 
Summary of 
ToRs discussion 
Writing Travel home 
 
14 | ICES WGFS REPORT 2010 
 
Annex 4: Structure, Agency and Embeddedness: Sociological Approaches 
to Fisheries Management Institutions 
By Douglas C. Wilson and Svein Jentoft 
Structure, Agency and Embeddedness: 
Sociological Approaches to Fisheries Management Institutions  
By Douglas Clyde Kongshøj Wilson and Svein Jentoft 
Pp 63–72 in Symes, D. (Ed) Alternative Management Systems
Abstract 
 Oxford: Blackwell Sci-
ence (1998) 
We relate fisheries management institutions to sociological theory in terms of one of 
its central debates - agency and structure. This is the question of whether society is 
best conceptualized as the product of the interaction of atomized individuals 
(agency) or as supra-individual social facts that are irreducible to individual actions 
(structure). 
Structural approaches are less adequate than agency approaches in both the clarity of 
their basic concepts and the elegance of their models. Agency approaches, however, 
have never succeeded in defining and modelling many consequential social phenom-
ena such as culture, norms, organization and power. Sociologists have begun to use 
the concept of embeddedness to bridge this gap. Approaches to fisheries manage-
ment have emphasized either agency or structure and produced two quite different 
accounts. Studies emphasizing agency define the management problem as how best 
to design institutions to avert the tragedy of the commons. Studies emphasizing 
structure focus on how management decisions more often reflect social power than 
rational institutional arrangements. We seek to combine the two through an em-
beddedness-based strategy. We define embeddedness as primarily a cultural phe-
nomenon: the breadth of shared understandings drawn upon in communicative 
interactions. We suggest that management can be analysed by tracing five forms of 
meaningful communications that differ in their degree of embeddedness: rational 
communication, prestige, influence, money and authority. We illustrate this approach 
using examples drawn from Atlantic coast fisheries management.  
Introduction 
Sociology has not been a central player in the evolution of our understanding of 
common pool resource management over the past twenty years. This lack of central-
ity has something of an ironic twist. The focal concept that has emerged in this evolu-
tion has been the social institution, specifically those institutions that are created to 
avert the tragedy of the commons. The irony is that sociologists have traditionally put 
a lot of work into understanding social institutions and have developed useful ana-
lytical tools to understand how they come about, how they work and how they 
change. The sociological perspective on institutions also challenges the reductionism 
of the rational choice-based concept of institutions dominant in resource economics 
and political science. While the rational choice approach has made a major contribu-
tion to understanding resource management (Bromley, 1991; Ostrom, 1990), it has 
also served to limit our imaginations about the potential forms that management 
institutions can take (Jentoft and McCay, 1995; Jentoft et al., 1998).  
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The present chapter relates fisheries management institutions to sociological theory 
in terms of one of its central debates - agency and structure. This is the question of 
whether society is best conceptualized as the product of the interaction of atomized 
individuals (agency) or as supra-individual social facts that are irreducible to indi-
vidual actions (structure). Agency approaches use an epistemology based on meth-
odological individualism. They currently enjoy greater prominence in the social 
science as a whole, where the rational choice approach to agency is dominant. Ra-
tional choice theory conceptualizes individuals as actors in pursuit of maximizing 
sets of utilities and makes use of game theory and other models of competition. Struc-
tural approaches focus on social facts such as shared norms, relations between social 
groups, and questions of power and dominance. Such approaches have historically 
been important in sociology. Marx, Durkheim, and Parsons all believed that human 
conduct is shaped by social forces beyond their personal control. Indeed they argued 
that very constitution of individuals as social actors is a social phenomenon. Humans 
live not only to fulfil their own ambitions, but also to respect and obey the demands 
and expectations that society put upon them. Individual ideologies, attitudes and 
perspectives express social relations. Individual interests stem from their positions in 
a social system. More recent formulations have emphasized how social structures are 
reciprocally reproduced by structurally determined individual agency (Giddens, 
1984). Thus, economic actors and their social relations are not only perceived as being 
controlled by social structures. They are also believed to be carriers of these struc-
tures.  
Structural approaches are less adequate than agency approaches in both the clarity of 
their basic concepts and the elegance of their models. Agency approaches, however, 
have never succeeded in defining and modelling many consequential social phenom-
ena such as culture, norms, organization and power. Sociologists have made some 
progress in finding ways to bridge this gap. For instance, social network theory (e.g. 
Burt 1982; Granovetter, 1992) conceptualizes individuals as embedded within sys-
tems of concrete, patterned interactions with other individuals. These patterned in-
teractions provide a concept of social structure that is well defined and allows 
theories involving supra-individual variables to be measured and tested.  
Our concern is the way that this dichotomy between agency and structure has been 
reflected in approaches to fisheries management institutions and how this em-
beddedness concept might aid us in bringing them together for a richer understand-
ing of how these institutions are created and maintained. We think that the 
embeddedness perspective as developed by Polanyi (1957) and Granovetter (1992) 
provides a bridge between structural and agency accounts of fisheries management. 
It maintains the basic dialectic perspective that man is both the producer and the 
product of society, and that social institution despite their "natural" appearance, are 
nevertheless the construct of social action and choice (cf. Berger and Luckman, 1966).  
In what follows, we begin with a brief outline of how approaches to fisheries man-
agement have emphasized either agency or structure and produced two quite differ-
ent accounts. We argue that each of these accounts contain insights that are crucial to 
understanding management. Studies emphasizing agency define the management 
problem as how best to design institutions to avert the tragedy of the commons. A 
central insight of this approach is the benefits that stakeholder participation brings to 
effective management. Studies emphasizing structure, on the other hand, have fo-
cused on the political nature of fisheries management and how management deci-
sions more often reflect structures of social power than they do freely arrived at 
agreements among stakeholders.  
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We then seek to develop an embeddedness-based analysis strategy for fisheries man-
agement institutions. We argue that understanding these institutions sociologically 
begins with the micro-level interactions that give institutions concrete form. First, we 
introduce and illustrate a model of management institutions resulting from a bar-
gaining process between stakeholder groups. Then, we draw heavily on Habermas’ 
(1984, 1987) work on communicative processes to specify an interpretation of the 
embeddedness perspective. We define embeddedness as primarily a cultural phe-
nomenon: the breadth of shared understandings drawn upon in communicative in-
teractions. We suggest that this bargaining process can be analysed by tracing the use 
of five forms of meaningful communications that differ by the degree to which they 
are embedded in shared understandings. We call these forms of communication 
“governance mechanizms” (Wilson and McCay, 1998) and identify five: rational 
communication, which draws extensively on shared meanings to reach a mutual un-
derstanding; prestige and influence which govern social networks; money, which 
governs markets; and authority, which governs bureaucracies. These different 
mechanizms have different strengths and weaknesses. We conclude with some re-
marks about how governance mechanizms can be useful in analysing fisheries man-
agement institutions.  
Approaches to Fisheries Management Emphasizing Agency 
The intellectual heart of the agency approach to fisheries management institutions is 
the tragedy of the commons. In its general form, this is one of the best known prob-
lems in social science. The problem of the free rider (Olson, 1968) or the social di-
lemma (Marwell and Ames, 1979) arises whenever the possibility exists for an actor 
to shift some of the costs of his or her activity on to a group. In situations of resource 
exploitation, the problem involves the harvesting of a resource beyond replacement 
levels, because actors receive all of the benefit of their exploitation while sharing the 
costs of overexploitation with all other users. This leads to overharvesting. Privatiza-
tion of the resource is often argued to be the best way to deal with the commons 
problem because it forces actors to bear all the costs of their exploitation (Dregne, 
1983; Gordon, 1954; Scott, 1955).  
Where private property is too difficult or costly to implement, other institutions to 
guard against the tragedy must be created. The question becomes how to bring peo-
ple together to formulate these institutions. This means some sort of community or 
state-based management process. Economists have generally approached this ques-
tion by asking how best to mimic individual property rights. This would call for a 
contribution from the state to facilitate such an institutional reform, but, by allowing 
market forces to work, the government could be relieved from its costly and trouble-
some burden as manager.  
Sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, and geographers, on the other hand, 
have focused on community-based approaches to avoiding overexploitation. There 
have been many studies of “common property” regimes (McCay and Acheson, 1987) 
where ownership of a resource and the management of access and effort are vested 
with some group larger than the individual. Others have looked at instances of “co-
management” where a group of users works with the government in various ways to 
avoid overexploitation (Jentoft, 1989; Pinkerton, 1989). Ostrom (1990) used a rational 
choice approach to identify the characteristics that common property institutions 
must have to effectively coordinate the actions of competing stakeholders.  
Other scholars (van der Schans, 1996; Wilson, 1996) have built on this work by intro-
ducing a communicative concept of rationality along side of the choice concept of 
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rationality used by Ostrom (1990) and others. These studies have focused on the 
qualities of involvement and participation by stakeholders in the management proc-
ess. When participation by stakeholders is open and well designed it is argued to aid 
management in several ways. One is to facilitate access to needed information by 
those making management decisions (Pinkerton, 1989) which includes aiding surveil-
lance of fishing activities to enable enforcement. Beyond the exchange of information, 
participation makes possible more open communications focused on the creation and 
renegotiation of the management institutions themselves. Such communications in-
crease the flexibility of the institutions to respond to ecological changes (Dryzek, 
1987; McCay and Jentoft, 1996). Overall, participation increases the “ecological ra-
tionality” (Dryzek, 1987) of management by making it more robust, responsive and 
flexible. Another key function of involvement and participation is to increase the 
legitimacy of the management measures. Legitimacy is enhanced through increased 
transparency in decision making process (Jentoft, 1989), greater accountability for 
management officials (Magrath, 1989), and increased respect for indigenous perspec-
tives on management (Pomeroy, 1993). This increased legitimacy attaches to individ-
ual management measures as well as the overall management process (Magrath, 
1989). The expectation here is that the more legitimate a resource management is 
perceived to be among users, the more inclined they are to abide by the rules. As Hall 
(1972:31) proclaims: “Compliance and involvement are interrelated phenomena.” 
Involvement is expected to enhance the proficiency of fisheries management. Thus, 
effective management remains dependent on the cooperation of those who cannot be 
physically excluded from the resource. This cooperation includes accepting the man-
agement institutions as legitimate, being willing to provide information, and being 
willing to negotiate in good faith as changes arise. It is true that such cooperation is 
rarely achieved, which helps explain why fisheries management is rarely effective.  
In sum, looking at fisheries management in terms of agency leads to two key conclu-
sions. First, without some sort of management institution a resource will be overex-
ploited by agents who are acting out of short-term, individual rationally, resulting in 
a collectively irrational, long-term outcome. Second, to be effective these manage-
ment institutions must meet one of three conditions: they must involve enforceable 
individual property rights which make it impossible for actors to avoid the costs of 
their overexploitation; they must involve state regulations that can be legitimately 
enacted, surveilled and enforced; or they must involve the active cooperation of re-
source stakeholders. The ecological factors that exist in most fisheries and the politi-
cal and legal realities that exist in most democracies make the first condition very 
difficult to meet. They also often make the second condition dependent on the third 
because legitimacy, surveillance and enforcement are all much easier with stake-
holder cooperation. Furthermore, the third condition often depends on the second as 
cooperation among users at the local level is a necessary, but insufficient, tool for 
addressing the subtraction that occurs on larger scales. This interdependency be-
tween the second and third conditions means that cooperation among actors is re-
quired along two dimensions: horizontally among users and user groups; and 
vertically, between user-groups on the one hand, and government agencies and re-
search institutions on the other.  
Approaches to Fisheries Management Emphasizing Structure 
Viewing fisheries management from the perspective of the social structure does not 
lead to the neat theoretical conclusions that the agency perspective does, but it often 
provides a more satisfying description of empirical situations. Fisheries management 
actions are political tools that have the effect of allocating profits and determining 
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relations of power. This allocation is often the most important factor in determining 
what actions will be taken. Competition over profit can be argued to be a more im-
portant concept for understanding the actual management process than maintaining 
sustainability in the face of the tragedy of the commons (Marchak, 1987). From this 
structural perspective, the tragedy of the commons model is used to legitimate a rela-
tionship between stakeholders and the state rooted in a need to define property rights 
that arises once profit becomes the reason for catching fish (Marchak, 1987). The state 
acts as the guarantor of both its own power and that of interests that have “captured” 
the state agencies (Libecap, 1989). From this perspective, the delegating of manage-
ment authority to user-organizations, i.e. co-management, may well lead to the fur-
ther empowering of special interests, and thus entrenching social inequities that 
already persist within the fishing industry (Davis and Bailey, 1996). Whatever the 
solution is, co-management can hardly be part of it, unless those basic predetermined 
inequities are rectified. 
Studies have found structural lines that affect fisheries management defined by eth-
nicity, gender, colonial domination, fishing sector and class. For ethnic groups, issues 
involving native North Americans are probably the best known cases, but these is-
sues arise around the world. Bailey (1986) outlines how the Indonesian government 
protected the interests of small-scale against large-scale fishers because the large-scale 
fishers were mainly ethnic Chinese. Jentoft and Carlsen (1996) describe conflicts over 
management between Norwegian and Saami fishers. Medard and Wilson (1996) ar-
gue that fisheries management decisions on Lake Victoria are having direct, negative 
impacts on riparian women. Chirwa (1989) outlines how colonial authorities abol-
ished traditional fishing methods, calling them 'dangerous and destructive' with little 
justification. Colonial authorities often caused the collapse of management regimes 
by undercutting traditional authorities and, in fact, imposing open access on fisheries 
where effective management institutions had been in place (Bromley 1990, Johannes 
1978). 
Issues of class and fishing sector are often closely linked. Barrett (1991) describes how 
a territorial use rights system worked well in Bermuda until the tourist boom broke 
down the normative system that supported it. Then an alliance between the tourist 
industry and conservation groups managed to put the blame on the artisanal fishers 
and the most common artisanal fishing methods were banned. A similar alliance, 
with similar arguments, pushed through a ban on commercial gillnets in Florida 
(Smith and Jepson 1993). Ferguson and Derman (1993) tell the story of a lake in Ma-
lawi where the drop in one species, which was preferred by the upper classes, be-
came defined as a “fisheries crisis” although no problem existed with other species in 
the lake. This led to the introduction of intrusive state management, albeit with “par-
ticipatory” rhetoric.  
Social structures do not merely define battle lines over allocation decisions. As 
Palmer and Sinclair (1996) demonstrate through interviews with Canadian fishers, 
these variables also strongly influence the perception and definition of the manage-
ment problem. The issue that these scholars raise, and that we seek to raise here in 
another fashion, is what it means to have “participation” in fisheries management 
when the very question in dispute is whose definition of both ecological and social 
reality is going to prevail? 
In sum, empirical fisheries management decisions are very often described most ac-
curately by structural accounts. Management decisions are driven more by struggles 
between groups with variable social power than rational management models sug-
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gest. These descriptions have an uneasy relationship to agency-driven theories of 
cooperative responses to the tragedy of the commons. The tragedy of the commons 
and the over-exploitation that accompanies it, however, is as much an empirical real-
ity as politically driven management solutions. The structural approach concludes 
that fisheries management is too narrowly defined. For fisheries management to be 
sustainable, a broader reform is needed than just new institutional fixes, such as 
ITQ’s or co-management, or any other remedy that is currently part of the fisheries 
management tool-box. It would also include structural policies such as fleet-
composition, issues pertaining to economic scale, and community organization and 
development. 
Building a Bridge: the Embeddedness Perspective  
Many of the social scientists who have taken a primarily agency-driven approach to 
management and participation have not been oblivious to structural problems (e.g., 
Bromley 1991; Ostrom 1990; Pinkerton 1994) and recent work has begun on how 
these perspectives can be linked. One promising approach has adopted Polanyi’s 
(1957) concept of embeddedness. A prominent advocate of this perspective is 
Granovetter (1992). Following Denis Wrong’s (1961) well-known argument, 
Granovetter points out that the agency/structure dichotomy is the result of competing 
“undersocialized” and “oversocialized” accounts of human behaviour. In the former 
actors are seen as utterly independent agents pursuing nothing but their individual 
interests while, in the latter, behaviours are choiceless expressions of structure-
determined socialization, as in Parsons, or false consciousness, as in Marx. Granovet-
ter (1992) argues that we can overcome this dichotomy by conceptualizing social 
structure as the concrete, patterned interactions of people in networks of social rela-
tions.  
"A fruitful analysis of human action requires us to avoid the atomiza-
tion of implicit in the theoretical extremes of under and oversocialized 
conceptions. Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social 
context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the 
particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. 
Their attempts at purposive actions are instead embedded in concrete, 
ongoing systems of social relations." Granovetter (1992:58) 
Granovetter’s concept of networks responds to what Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) 
call the “anti-categorical imperative”, i.e. the need to conceptualize structural influ-
ences on individuals without reducing these individuals to mere representatives of 
categories. The anti-categorical imperative insists that understanding social structure 
benefits neither from placing individuals within structural categories, e.g. class, nor 
ignoring individual choices. Granovetter and other network researchers have 
achieved this goal by using a rational choice concept of agency within a network per-
spective. Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) argue that remaining wedded to rational 
choice is not necessary to maintain the anti-categorical imperative. They suggest that 
there is nothing intrinsic to network analysis that precludes attention to the cultural 
discourses, identities and narratives which, in fact, help define and maintain net-
works. 
Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) point to the importance of the cultural idioms that 
actors draw upon in communications. Analyzing these idioms provides a description 
of the social structure that is independent of and complementary to networks while 
maintaining the anti-categorical imperative. Agency and structure-based theories 
both treat the meaning content of communications as an epiphenomenon - merely an 
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expression of either structurally determined ideologies and attitudes, or rhetorical 
strategies to attain utilities. They both miss the fact that it is through communications 
that mutual understandings of situations, including understandings of social struc-
ture, are created and recreated by people within them (Habermas, 1984). An em-
beddedness approach that followed Emirbayer and Goodwin’s (1994) advice 
recognizes that, while communications include both ideological and rhetorical com-
ponents, they also draw upon and reproduce the shared reality in which individuals 
pursue their utilities and the social structure is maintained. 
The bureaucratic approach to fisheries management, by and large, disregards the 
extent to which fisheries practices are embedded in human communities. Fisheries 
management typically has an individualistic bias. The receiver of licences and quotas 
are always individuals, mostly boat-owners, sometimes corporations, but hardly ever 
local communities. Management systems, with their basic assumptions founded on 
methodological individualism and rational choice rarely has a focus on the social 
relations of fishers, their networks, communities and associations. There are, how-
ever, some interesting exceptions, some of them famous, such as the Japanese man-
agement system for inshore fisheries where producer cooperatives play a prominent 
part, and the Alaska "community development quotas". But not even these examples 
should be regarded as ideal cases, as they often fail to live up to some of their expec-
tations concerning social equity and justice (cf. Barret and Okudfiara, 1995). In their 
analysis of a Canadian co-management program, Davis and Bailey (1996) argue that 
what is often missing in such programs is how small-boat fishers are rooted in the 
community. The programs ignored variation within a community and the result was 
that co-management had entrenched elite power.  
By looking at how the fishers are embedded in the community the relationship be-
tween power and participation is revealed. McCay and Jentoft (1996) echo both 
Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) and Habermas (1987) when they argue that em-
beddedness implies both that economic behaviours, such as fishing, should be ana-
lysed from the perspective of their social dimensions and that cultural systems differ 
in how embedded economic behaviour is. They also refer to the Giddens' concept of 
dis-embedding, when they point out the tendency in current management ap-
proaches to "lift out" of the community the management the responsibilities and prac-
tices that are part of their traditional patterns of collective action. Jentoft et.al. (1998) 
see co-management as a means of counteracting that tendency, as an institution for 
reembedding of management functions in the community, be it geographical, func-
tional or epistemic. 
We believe that the embeddedness concept has clear promise as a way to bring to-
gether our agency and structure-based understandings of management. We need to 
identify alternatives to current management practices, if not for other reasons that 
most have failed dismally. We think that it is essential then to search out and discuss 
the basic perspectives on which management practices start from and rest. Rather 
than throwing out the net to see what comes up, we need to be more selective and 
targeted in our approach to fisheries management. But for that, we need a theory that 
will enable us to systematically address what we can expect from concrete manage-
ment initiatives and institutions. 
The problem is that embeddedness is a slippery concept. There is a real danger of it 
being defined so loosely as to simply be another general word for “society,” void of 
analytic content. Granovetter (1992) tried to avoid this by tying the concept to ob-
servable patterned interactions among people. Following Emirbayer and Goodwin’s 
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(1994) critique, however, a rational choice-based concept of networks that focuses 
only on observable patterns and not on communicative content cannot adequately 
capture structural influences. The remaining part of this paper attempts to expand 
the usefulness of the concept of embeddedness for analysing fisheries management 
institutions. Drawing on Habermas (1984, 1987), we apply a concept of embedded-
ness that is based on the communicative content of interactions, but which specifies a 
set of identifiable communicative mechanizms that are differentiated by the degree to 
which they are embedded in shared meanings. Before we can apply this model to 
fisheries management, however, we need to outline a communications-based under-
standing of fisheries management institutions. 
A Bargaining Model of Fisheries Management Institutions 
Fisheries management is about creating social institutions which are meant to guard 
the sustainability of the resource. Closed seasons, mesh size regulations, marketing 
cooperatives, and management councils are all examples of such institutions. Follow-
ing Scott (1995), we define institutions as patterned social interactions with behav-
ioural, cognitive and normative dimensions. This definition expands the prevailing 
concept of management institutions that emphasizes only the rule aspect and it gives 
management systems a predominantly legalistic content. Our approach to institu-
tions emphasizes their reliance on shared meanings that define behaviours and cogni-
tions as fitting or not fitting particular normative patterns. The emphasis is not on the 
rule content of fisheries management. It is on the shared meanings which create the 
procedures and knowledge bases through which these rules are determined. It is this 
subtle shift that most clearly reveals the benefits to be derived from co-management 
approaches. Only this broader definition of institutions can perceive and appreciate 
the contribution and relevance of the knowledge that user-groups provide into the 
decision-making process.   
Building from this definition, we adopt an analytic strategy that begins with the day-
to-day, person-to-person interactions which give concrete expression to social institu-
tions. The shared meanings that form institutions are created and interpreted through 
communicative actions. The authorities, organizations and regulations that make up 
a fisheries management system are attempts to create specific patterns in the interac-
tions of human bodies, and their technological extensions, with an aquatic ecosystem. 
It is at this micro level of institutional interpretation and creation that the questions of 
legitimacy, politics and economics come together and take on whatever force they 
have in patterning these concrete interactions between people and the ecosystem. 
Institutions are continually recreated (or broken down) by actions and the ways these 
actions are interpreted as following or not following the institution, in the same way 
that the ethnomethodolgists demonstrated is true of norms in general. These re-
searchers showed that norms are not structural phenomena that define appropriate 
behavior in a situation a priori; rather they are created through processes of deciding 
on, accounting for, and rationalizing behaviour in discourse (Heritage 1984). It is this 
process that relates shared meanings to concrete ecological outcomes. Fisheries man-
agement institutions are created and recreated through a bargaining process that 
consists not just of explicit bargaining over the codification of specific rules, but im-
plicit bargaining over how compliance with the institution will be interpreted and 
enforced. Furthermore, institutions that are not codified, e.g. values, identities, etc., 
have a crucial role in determining how a resource is treated. These uncodified institu-
tions are also created and recreated through interpretation and enforcement. 
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Here is a simple example. One author was a recent a passenger on a charter fishing 
trip. The primary target was striped bass and the two-fish-per-person bag limit was 
caught an hour and a half into the six-hour trip. While the aggregate limit had been 
caught, not every passenger had caught two fish. The captain ordered the mate to 
throw over dead two of the smallest of the eight, legal-sized fish in the cooler. Then, 
when the person who had not yet caught two legal-sized fish had done so, the cap-
tain told the passengers that this was as much as he was willing to push the regula-
tions and suggested they shift to catching summer flounder.  
The example illustrates several things. Enforcement was only possible in relation to 
the total number of fish landed, so it was the legitimacy of the regulation alone which 
gave it what force it had to affect behaviour regarding discards. This force, however, 
was entangled with other imperatives, such as making sure every passenger got their 
bag limit. The management institution codified as “the vessel may only land two 
legal-sized fish per person” was expressed with the addendum that “the vessel may 
continue to catch legal-sized fish until every individual has two, even if this means 
killing more fish than the limit.” This interpretation expressed the management insti-
tution in that concrete moment. If there had been no alternative fishery, or if one of 
the passengers had expressed dissatisfaction with the size of his two striped bass, 
then another interpretation may have expressed the institution. 
From the communications-based perspective we are developing we define em-
beddedness as follows: the breadth of shared understandings drawn upon in com-
municative interactions. A more embedded interaction means that those participating 
in the interaction draw on a broader range of background assumptions about mean-
ings. These shared background assumptions point to understandings of social 
groups, personalities, and, especially, culture (Habermas, 1987). 
Bargaining over the definition of institutions draws continually upon cultural ac-
counts of both society and the resource. In line with the "new-institutionalism" devel-
oping in organizational theory (Powell and DiMaggiol, 1991), we believe that any 
analysis of the efficacy of fisheries management institutions must seek out these 
background, "taken-as-given" understandings. In other words, we must begin with 
how users interpret management institutions against these background understand-
ings to be able explore the entire range of possibilities and potentials for institutional 
reform. We must perceive management institutions as embedded in a cultural con-
text. This should not be interpreted too narrowly, as is the danger when the word 
“culture” is associated with picturesque fishing villages. Global markets have, albeit 
rudimentary, cultures as well, and fisheries science takes place within a culture that 
includes rigorously (and sometimes rigidly) defined notions of what constitutes valid 
descriptions of the resource. 
Bargaining over the definitions of institutions takes place between groups of stake-
holders. This means that some of the most important cultural accounts are those that 
define the identity of these groups. Identities, patterned interactions, and shared eco-
nomic and political interests give form to these groups. These groups have differen-
tial abilities to reach a mutual understanding within the group to coordinate actions, 
as well as differential access to resources - both of which are important in the bargain-
ing over institutions. 
We choose the word “bargaining” to describe this process because it captures the 
image of an activity involving competitive give and take in which the relative advan-
tages possessed by actors are of primary concern. The choice of this word has several 
problems as well (Wilson and McCay 1997). The most important is that “bargaining” 
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is usually thought of as something that happens between individuals. Creating insti-
tutions, however, is a contest over meanings and meanings are intended to be shared. 
The struggle over the definition of institutions is a struggle between groups that 
should not be reduced to individuals. Bargaining participants are all carriers of so-
cially constructed meanings and reality perceptions. To understand how people ar-
gue when they bargain, one must understand where they come from personally, 
socially and culturally. Another objection is that many of the groups that participate 
in this bargaining over institutions will not have enough power to get "to the table" in 
any sort of formal sense. In this case bargaining must be thought of as the tacit proc-
ess where a group’s only power may come from access to the "back regions" beyond 
the surveillance required if institutions will affect behaviour (Giddens, 1984, Scott 
1990). Finally, bargaining implies a process which is completed when an agreement is 
reached, an agreement which will then be in force as long as its explicit duration. The 
bargaining that is involved in creating and maintaining institutions is dynamic and 
ongoing. This bargaining process is particularly dynamic in fisheries management 
because of volatility of aquatic ecosystems leads to constant changes in the physical 
parameters which the institutions mirror and because of the difficulty of observing 
compliance.  
An Embeddedness-Based Analysis Strategy 
We have been working to develop the concept of “governance mechanizm” as a pos-
sible approach to analysing the bargaining over fisheries management institutions at 
the micro level and relating these struggles to larger social structures (Wilson and 
McCay 1998). The basic idea is a modified version of Habermas’ (1984, 1987) Theory 
of Communicative Action. Governance mechanizms are different ways of coordinat-
ing social action that operate by determining what needs to be discussed to bring 
interactions to closure. They are expressed within communicative interactions at the 
micro level. All institutions operate through a mixture of governance mechanizms 
(Wilson and McCay 1998).  
Communications that draw fully upon shared meanings to reach a non-coercive con-
sensus are one kind of governance mechanizm. Following Habermas (1984), we call 
this mechanizm “rational communication” and suggest that it is the most flexible and 
ecologically robust (Dryzek, 1987) way to make decisions about fisheries manage-
ment. The studies of participation mentioned above tell us that when all participants 
are able to openly draw upon the entire range of their shared understandings of 
words, associations, values, and social orders the communications process yields the 
most contextually nuanced outcomes and the greatest possible legitimacy (Dryzek, 
1987; Jentoft 1989). It is important to differentiate between institutions and govern-
ance mechanizms. Science is the best example of an institution that makes primary 
use of rational communication. The institution of science, however, also uses other 
governance mechanizms to coordinate its activities. But the heavy use that science 
makes of rational communication demonstrates the strengths this mechanizm has in 
creating mutual understandings that reflect reality as closely as possible. Scientists 
are free to raise any argument to challenge conclusions and these arguments must be 
met with other arguments. Rational communication, on the other hand, is a cumber-
some mechanizm for coordinating activities over large-scales and is unpredictable in 
its outcomes.  
In addition to rational communication, other governance mechanizms operate, but 
they are less embedded in shared background understandings. Rather than using an 
achieved mutual understanding, they utilize people’s interlocking strategic objectives 
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to coordinate action (Habermas, 1987; Wilson 1998). Prestige and influence are two 
such mechanizms (Habermas, 1987) and social networks are the institutions that rely 
heavily on them. Prestige points to individuals having greater power to determine 
outcomes based on characteristics that increase their attractiveness, while influence 
points to greater power that derives from control of exchange values. These mecha-
nizms are still substantially embedded in the background assumptions about mean-
ing because they still rely on discussions to coordinate action, but they are less 
embedded than rational communications because there is no need for an open dis-
cussion to arrive at a non-coercive consensus.  
Two other governance mechanizms are money and authority. These mechanizms are 
much less embedded in shared meanings than the other three. Markets are the insti-
tutions that make extensive use of money, while bureaucracies make extensive use of 
authority. These mechanizm are not entirely free of shared meanings (indeed they are 
themselves shared meanings), but they require little or no discussion drawing on 
other shared meanings to coordinate action. Money coordinated interactions always 
come to a point where actors must decide to “take it or leave it” according to the real-
ity of the market situation. Authority eliminates the need for discussions about who 
will make final decisions. These two governance mechanizms confront each partici-
pant as a distinct system over which she has little or no control. Disembedded 
mechanizms tend to narrow options and often block opportunities for richer commu-
nications. The advantage of the more disembedded mechanizms, however, is that 
they can coordinate actions over larger scales, and they are more predictable (Wilson 
and McCay, 1998). 
We suggest that, when further developed, these five governance mechanizms, differ-
entiated as they are by the degree to which they are embedded in shared meanings, 
may offer an illuminating way to use the concept of embeddedness in the analysis, 
including comparative analyses, of fisheries management institutions.  
The following example shows the importance of the mixture of governance mecha-
nizms. A recent series of advisory panel meetings were held in a joint US and state 
management program. The underlying issue was one of distribution, and some advi-
sors represented fishers from states that wanted more of the quota currently enjoyed 
by another set of states represented by other advisors. At the first meeting, the gov-
ernment representatives demanded that the advisors stop debating each other and 
focus on the pre-defined issues at hand. This meeting had no meaningful outcome for 
resolving the problem. At a second meeting, the use of formal rules and specific mo-
tions curtailed open discussions and kept the fishers focused on what divided them. 
However, when they finally had a chance, due to the intervention of several influen-
tial individuals, to move beyond formal procedures and talk more openly they made 
progress at identifying areas of compromise over the problems of allocating quota. 
This was because they were able to widen the discussion to include other species and 
alternative rules and because they were able to listen to other fishers’ interpretation 
of the “historical participation” on which the quota was based. This was not possible 
when they were only allowed to discuss motions based on particular, already defined 
provisions of the proposed amendment. Reflecting the unpredictability of this open-
ness from the managers’ perspective, they also worked to strengthen their own soli-
darity as fishers vis-à-vis the management process. In this example, when the use of 
authority to coordinate the interactions was overemphasized, the advantages that 
come from the more embedded mechanizms were lost. 
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There are crucial differences between the effects that different governance mecha-
nizms have on bargaining over institutions. Money and authority tend to make it 
more formal and constrained, limiting communicative give and take in interpreting 
the institutions. Their systemic character locks people into specific strategic goals that 
they must achieve, and makes it more difficult to reach a mutual understanding. 
Strategies are often enhanced by withholding information rather than sharing it. 
Networks are not as constrained as hierarchies and markets, and allow less formal 
interactions in future bargaining (Thompson, et al., 1991). Hence, they are both less 
predictable and more flexible. Networks do not confront participants as an immuta-
ble system and allow greater latitude in building up a mutual understanding.  
Conclusion 
The chief problem with both agency and structural approaches is that they treat the 
content of communications as unimportant. One effect of this is that they abstract 
away the whole dimension of validity. Validity is a characteristic of the communica-
tive content of interactions. These perspectives reduce the content of communications 
to mere superstructure, either one more strategic action among others or a choiceless 
expression of a person’s location in the social structure. One of the main difficulties in 
analysing any sort of regulatory situation is the relationship between the validity of 
the regulation in the eyes of stakeholders and the facticity of strategic interactions 
(Habermas, 1994). The embeddedness perspective reveals how both of these dimen-
sions are present in micro-level interactions as participants are faced with the dual 
tasks of pursuing their interests and building up a mutual understanding of the situa-
tion (Habermas, 1984). The embeddedness approach responds not only to the dispar-
ity in the accounts of empirical situations that these two approaches yield, it does so 
in a way that no longer ignores the questions of validity (particularly, but not exclu-
sively, scientific validity), which anyone familiar with real world management de-
bates knows are vital. 
In offering this broad outline of an embeddedness approach, an element that has 
received little attention is how social power affects the bargaining over institutions. A 
bottom–up analysis of embeddedness that begins with communicative actions and 
physical behaviours, however, does not ignore questions of social power. It begins 
where power is made manifest in the inclusion or exclusion of voices in the bargain-
ing over institutions and their meanings. The analysis then traces the governance 
mechanizms to macro structures and asks how the particular mixture of mechanizms 
that is shaping this bargaining came into being.  
This approach is limited in its ability to produce generalizable knowledge because of 
the highly contextual nature of shared meanings. However, it is able to produce ap-
plicable knowledge for concrete, empirical situations and suggest hypotheses for 
more generalizable studies. It also describes information that is, at least intuitively, 
available to participants in the local context. It provides a critique of the interactions 
in which the positions of all the participants are related to their shared understand-
ings and strategic actions. It brings self-consciousness to the responsibility that all 
these participants share in defining institutions. Dealing with such an analysis may, 
at times, force participants to take a decentered relationship to the bargaining proc-
ess, and provide other participants with language that can be used to demand such a 
decentered relationship. This will, hopefully, increase the probability of compromise 
and flexibility. 
Tying this approach to the governance mechanizms focuses attention on the central 
problem of institutional flexibility and its trade-off with predictability. From a practi-
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cal perspective, it gives us a new way to talk about what we are after with co-
management programs. Co-management is about capturing flexibility by shifting 
from our over-reliance on bureaucratic rules and markets as mechanizms for govern-
ing management institutions to greater reliance on rational communication and net-
works of stakeholders. Networks do not present themselves to participants as 
unalterable systems. They govern institutions in ways that are adaptable to shifting 
circumstances. This should not be overdrawn, the predictability that markets and 
bureaucratic rules offer must also be present, but co-management is precisely about 
creating a space within these systems where legitimacy and flexibility can also be 
used as resources for effective management.  
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Annex 3: WGFS terms of reference for the next meeting 
The Working Group on Fishery Systems (WGFS), chaired by Dorothy Dankel*, 
Norway, will be renamed the Working Group on Maritime Systems (WGMS) and 
will meet in Bergen, Norway from 31 October – 4 November, 2011 to: 
a ) Review the 2011 reports from all Expert Groups that report to ACOM to 
get a global picture of ICES advice contributions from a perspective of ma-
rine governance;  
b ) Based on this review, evaluate current practices in ICES in light of best 
practices of the science-policy interface. We will point out areas where im-
provements can be made. 
WGFS will report by 1 December, 2011 (via SSGSUE) to the attention of the SCICOM. 
Supporting Information 
Priority The main focus of WGFS is the fishery system and the role of scientific advice 
within that system. The system-based approach relates directly to priorities such 
as developing an ecosystem-based approach to management and the effective 
implementation of the precautionary approach. Consequently, these activities 
have a very high priority. The work of the Group is also essential if ICES is to 
advance the development of realistic projections of fisheries development that 
account for the reaction of other parts of the overall fisheries system. 
Scientific 
justification and 
relation to action 
plan 
The main focus of WGFS is the fishery system and the role of scientific advice 
within that system. The system-based approach relates directly to priorities such 
as developing an ecosystem-based approach to management and the effective 
implementation of the precautionary approach. Consequently, these activities 
have a very high priority. The work of the Group is also essential if ICES is to 
advance the development of realistic projections of fisheries development that 
account for the reaction of other parts of the overall fisheries system. 
Resource 
requirements 
Secretariat support for meeting. 
Participants These include scientists working with fisheries management, both from an 
economic, social and biological perspective. Participation is from ICES countries 
and scientists both from disciplines and scientific circles not traditionally 
represented at ICES. 
Secretariat 
facilities 
No additional software/hardware is anticipated beyond that which is currently 
available. 
Financial No financial implications. 
Linkages to 
advisory 
committees 
The goal for this Working Group is to better understand fishery and greater 
maritime management systems which is a central element of the work of 
ACOM. 
Linkages to other 
committees or 
groups 
Close links to SGMAS and SGRAMA who address the technical aspects of man-
agement strategies, also WGICZM (future name: WGMPCAM). 
Linkages to other 
organizations 
WGFS will continue to seek to widen participation for this group, including 
contact with relevant academic and inter-governmental organizations. 
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Annex 4: Recommendations 
WGFS will be renamed to Working Group on Maritime Systems (WGMS). Our rea-
soning on this name change is based on the following points: 
 
RECOMMENDATION FOR FOLLOW UP BY: 
1. Broader inclusion of marine sectors beyond fisheries, for 
example within the Integrated Maritime Policy and the Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive 
SSGSUE/SCICOM 
2. The new naming from “Fishery” to “Maritime” is more 
appropriate to the ecosystem approach and for extending our 
peer community outside solely fisheries 
SSGSUE/SCICOM 
 
 
